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JURISDICTION 
This action is before the Supreme Court on a Writ of Certiorari to review of a 
decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Bench, Garff, and 
Jackson (herein "Panel"). The Panel's decision affirmed dismissal of this action by the 
district court. It was filed June 7, 1990, and rehearing wis denied August 6, 1990. The 
Supreme Court granted the City's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on December 12, 1991, 
pursuant to §78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code and Rule 46 of ^he Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for determination: 
1. Whether the lower courts misperceived legislative intent in construing 
applicable statutes and ordinances. 
2. Whether the district court erred in upholding Salt Lake County 
development approvals. 
3. Whether the appeal court panel erred in upholding the ruling of the 
district court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. ANp ORDINANCES 
(With Emphasis Added) 
Utah Statutes: 
§10-2-401 The Legislature hereby declares that itj is legislative policy that: 
(1) Sound urban development is essential fo the continued economic 
development of this state; 
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services 
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare in residential, commercial anfi industrial areas, and in 
areas undergoing development; 
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with specific 
standards, to include areas where a hi$i quality of urban governmental 
services is needed and can be provided pr the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation and the 
proliferation of special service districts; 
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate 
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing 
municipality, subject to Section 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the 
annexation; 
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized 
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents 
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government; 
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban 
development need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of 
the proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other 
governmental entities, on the need for and cost of local government 
services and the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, 
and on factors related to population growth and density and the geography 
of the area; and 
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens 
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state 
responsibility. 
§10-2-418 Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-
half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if 
the municipality is willing to annex the territory proposed for such 
development under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter, 
provided, however, that a property owner desiring to develop or improve 
property within the said one-half mile area may notify the municipality in 
writing of said desire and identify with particularity all legal and factual 
barriers preventing an annexation to the municipality. At the end of 12 
consecutive months from the filing with the municipality of said notice and 
after a good faith and diligent effort by said property owner to annex, said 
property owner may develop as otherwise permitted by law. 
(I) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class, 
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah, 
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term does not include 
counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments. 
* * * 
(II) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving 
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per 
§10-1-104 
§10-1-104 
2 
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development pr which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 pr any or all phases. 
§10-9-9 [Prior to 1989 Amendment] Appealjs to the [city] board of 
adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any officer, 
department, board, or bureau of the municipality affected by any decision 
of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a 
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the 
officer from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a 
notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom 
the appeal is taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all 
the papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from 
was taken. 
§10-9-15 The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the [city] board 
of adjustment may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom 
in any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is 
presented to the court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in 
the office of the board. 
§17-27-16 Appeals to the [county] board of adjustment may be taken by any 
person aggrieved by his inability to obtain la building permit, or by the 
decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon or made in the 
course of the administration or enprcement of the provisions of the zoning 
resolution. Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any 
officer, department, board or bureau of the county affected by the grant or 
refusal of a building permit or by other decision of an administrative officer 
or agency based on or made in the course of the administration or 
enprcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution. The time within 
which such appeal must be made, and the form or other procedure relating 
thereto, shall be as specified in the general rules provided in writing by the 
board of county commissioners to govern the procedure of such board of 
adjustment or in the supplemental rules of procedure adopted by such 
board provided further that said rules and regulations shall be available to 
the public at the office of the county commissioners at all times. 
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall have the following 
powers: 
(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is Alleged by the appellant that 
there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by 
administrative official or agency based on or piade in the enprcement of 
the zoning resolution. 
(2) To hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions off any such 
resolution, requests for special exceptions or tor interpretation of the map 
or for decision upon other special questions ijpon which such board is 
3 
authorized by any such resolution to pass. 
(3) Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of a 
specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the regulation, 
or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary 
and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict 
application of any regulation enacted under this act would result in 
peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue 
hardships upon, the owner of such property, to authorize, upon an appeal 
relating to said property, a variance from such strict application so as to 
relieve such difficulties or hardship, provided such relief may be granted 
without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially 
impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning resolutions. 
The concurring vote of four members of the board in the case of a 
five-member board, and of three members in the case of a three-member 
board, shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or 
determination of any such administrative official or agency or to decide in 
favor of the appellant. 
Salt Lake County Ordinance: 
§19.84.090 The planning commission shall not authorize a conditional use permit 
unless the evidence presented is such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular location is necessary or 
desirable to provide a service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the community; and 
B. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, 
be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons residing 
or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or improvements in the 
vicinity; and 
C. That the proposed use will comply with the regulations and conditions 
specified in this title for such use; and 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the intent of the county master 
plan. 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 56 This rule appears as Appendix "A" to this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed in the Third District Court t}y Sandy City to challenge Salt 
Lake County approvals of a 4.18 acre commercial development in an unincorporated 
island within Sandy's boundaries. State statutes restrict projects in unincorporated areas 
which are adjacent to city boundaries if development costs exceed $750,000. Motions for 
summary judgment were filed by all parties in the districti court. The City also moved to 
strike certain affidavits and documents and filed a Rule 36(f) affidavit in support of its 
request for additional discovery time. The City's motions! were denied and summary 
judgment was entered for defendants. 
A Panel of the Court of Appeals (Taner) affirmed the trial court's judgment.1 
The Panel based its decision on an issue which had not bben previously considered, 
briefed or argued. It erroneously concluded that the City) had not properly appealed a 
County rezoning of the property. The Panel also applied la standard of review which 
gave undue deference to County discretion in determining its own jurisdictional limits. 
The City's Petition for Rehearing was denied. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts of record are unrefuted: 
The Parties 
1. Sandy City ("City") is a Utah municipality of jthe third class, created to 
provide urban governmental services essential for sound uifban development and for the 
protection of public health, safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial 
The Panel's opinion is set forth in Appendix "B." 
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areas, and in areas undergoing development.2 As a Utah city, Sandy has the full range 
of financial and statutory powers needed to provide these services within its existing 
boundaries and into annexing areas.3 
2. Defendant Salt Lake County ("County") is a subdivision of the state of 
Utah, organized and functioning under authority of Title 17 Utah Code Anno. 1953.4 
Although it lacks the powers of a municipality, it is attempting to deliver municipal-type 
services under the theory that it is a "defacto city"5. 
3. Defendant County Planning Commission is a committee of County 
residents appointed by the County to approve unincorporated area development. 
Members of the commission are not required to possess training or experience of any 
sort and the record discloses no evidence of board expertise in development or land use 
planning.6 
The Property and Its Authorized Uses 
4. This action involves a single parcel of approximately 4.18 acres ("Property") 
located on the northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East, in unincorporated Salt 
Lake County.7 The Property is located on the edge of an unincorporated island within 
the limits of the City such that it is separated from City limits only by 1300 East Street. 
2
 Record at 2; see also, UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(2). 
3
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(2), (4). 
4
 Record at 3. 
5
 County brief in Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113, p. 23. 
6
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-2. 
7
 Record at 4. 
6 
5. The Developers purchased the Property in! 1987 with the express intention 
to develop a multiphased "commercial subdivision."8 The first phase was the Chevron 
service complex and the second phase was a McDonaldsl restaurant. There are also 
other phases of development on the Property. They havfe not been disclosed by the 
developers; however, costs of development in all phases will run to millions dollars/ 
6. Since its adoption in 1976, the County master plan for the area has called 
for rural residential uses on the Property.10 Sandy City pilaris also specify similar such 
uses.n The Property has historically been zoned Residential (R-1-8) consistent with both 
City and County plans,12 however, since initiation of this action, it has been partially 
developed for commercial purposes contrary to the rural residential standard of these 
plans. 
Annexation - First Step of the Approval Process 
7. The City has adopted an Annexation Plan, consistent with its master plan, 
as required by state statute. The purpose of this plan is to officially declare the 
unincorporated areas which the City is able and willing toi annex. The Property is within 
the area the City has agreed to annex under that plan.13 The effect of adoption of the 
Annexation Plan is to prohibit County approval of commetcial development in excess of 
° Record at 162,164. 
9
 Record at 133-135. 
10
 Record at 100, 165. 
11
 Record at 239. 
12
 Record at 100, 102. 
13
 Record at 34, Transcript at 30. 
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$750,00014 on the Property, unless the property owners have first attempted to annex to 
the City.t5 
8. It is undisputed that land costs alone for the site exceed $750,000. 
However, the developers did not attempt to annex16 Their apparent intention was to 
obtain more liberal zoning and development standards from Salt Lake County. 
Accordingly, they applied directly to the County for commercial zoning of the property -
- thus avoiding an annexation hearing before the City, as called for at this stage of the 
development process. 
Zoning - Second Step of the Approval Process 
9. The County received the developers' zoning request on April 9, 1987.1? 
The developers omitted the estimate of project value required on the application form; 
but they did admit that the rezoning would not comply with the County's current land 
use plan.18 
10. There was substantial neighborhood resistance to the rezoning.19 The 
developers made concessions to residential neighbors in order to minimize opposition.20 
One concession was to seal off the development from the unincorporated neighborhoods 
This amount refers to "cost projections" for "any or all phases" of development. UTAH CODE ANN. 
10-1-101(11). 
15
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-418. 
16
 Record at 11. 
17
 Record at 15. 
18
 Record at 15. 
19
 Record at 108, 163, 165. 
20
 Record at 110, 246. 
8 
by an eight foot cinder block wall, so that it faced only $andy City.21 The owners also 
agreed that they would be the sole developers of the project and that all construction 
would proceed as a single development.22 The owners were successful at overcoming 
some County and community resistance through this and I other means.23 
11. The County sent the City a copy of the rezbning application and requested 
its recommendation.24 This correspondence omitted the estimate of project value but 
admitted noncompliance with the County's current land use plan then in effect.25 The 
City filed a written objection to the rezoning stating that the rezoning would violate the 
City's Comprehensive Plan and Crescent Community Citizen's Report,26 as well as the 
County's own Master Plan, and that "[t]he developer shoiild seek annexation and zoning 
from Sandy."27 
12. The County held a hearing on August 5, 19$7, to consider the rezoning 
request. There is no record that the City received notice of the hearing and its 
representatives did not attend.28 Nevertheless, the County Commission was briefed at 
the hearing on Sandy's objection to the rezoning.29 
21
 Record at 114-115, 167, 248. 
22
 Record at 245. 
23
 Record at 115. 
24
 Record at 15-17. 
25
 Record at 15. 
26
 Record at 7. 
27
 Record at 17. 
Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2. 
29 
Envelope 5, document 6. 
9 
13. A simple sketch of the project site may have been available at the time of 
rezoning.30 However, there was "not a specific use proposed for the overall properties" 
at the time the application was made or when rezoning was considered31 and it would 
have been impossible for an estimate of the cost of development to be made at that 
time.32 Nevertheless, the Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that the 
project may exceed the $750,000 development limitation, depending on how the 
development plans were eventually presented. He concluded that "Sandy could object to 
that anyway," presumably when plans were submitted to obtain permits.33 
14. On August 5, 1987, the County granted the developers' request and 
amended its zoning to allow commercial development (Commercial C-2 and Residential 
RM/zc) on the Property34. The new zones contain development standards which are 
substantially lower than permitted in Sandy City zones just across the street.35 The 
County master plan was not amended to accommodate the new zone and continued to 
call for "rural residential" uses on the property.36 The new zone likewise continued to 
contradict the City's Comprehensive Plan and Crescent Community Citizen's Report.37 
30
 Envelope 6 #21. 
Record at 15, Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904. 
2
 The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask 
for a different zone depending on the market." The zoning was thereupon approved by the County 
Commission without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property. 
33
 Envelope 5, document 6, p. 906. 
34
 Record at 18-19, 102-103. 
35
 Record at 25, 109, and 114. 
36
 Record at 100, 165. 
37
 Record at 17. 
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The ordinance was published on August 20, 1987.38 
15. The City learned of the rezoning and, within 30 days after publication, 
petitioned the County for a rehearing of its zoning decision.39 That petition reiterated 
that "[development on the property would constitute 'urban development' and that the 
property owners had not attempted to annex the property to Sandy City as required by 
§10-2-418 U.C.A. 1953." The petition also stated that "[t]he granting of the RM/zc and 
C-2 zoning contradicts the Little Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for 
rural residential use on the property."40 
16. The County Commission reviewed the City^ petition but did not permit 
City representatives to speak.41 The Commission denied the City's request and directed 
that if the City wished to pursue its objection, it should d<t> so before the Planning 
Commission through the conditional use permit process.42 
Conditional Use Permits - Third Step of the [Approval Process 
17. On August 26, 1987, Chevron's agent applied! to Salt Lake County for a 
Conditional Use Permit for construction of the first phase) of the development -
approximately .7 acres.43 Such a permit is required by Salt Lake County ordinances for 
commercial development within this zone.44 
38
 Record at 19. 
39
 Record at 25. 
40
 Record at 25. 
Transcript at 6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p. 1190. Compaife with the Panel Opinion which 
asserts that Sandy had "ample opportunity to present evidence." p. 13. 
Envelope 5, Documents 8-9. 
43
 Record at 20. 
44
 Record at 21-22A. 
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18. The application proposed a service station, convenience store and car 
wash,45 with a stated cost of $250,000.46 However, the actual cost of the Chevron phase 
was $650,000 to $770,000, which included the price of the .7 acre Chevron pad, but did 
not include land or improvement costs for any other projects on the remaining 3.48 
acres of the subdivision.47 
19. On about September 30, 1987 (approximately one month after the first 
phase application), the property owners, through their agent, filed a second application 
for a conditional use. This application was for a McDonald's Restaurant to be located 
on the Property adjacent to and immediately to the north of the Chevron Center.48 
Neither McDonalds nor Chevron were owners of the property at the time of their 
applications or at any time during 1987.49 
20. The application for this second phase (McDonalds Restaurant) specified 
the value of the project, including land, to be $300,000.50 However, the stand-alone costs 
of the second phase were $900,000 to $1,100,000.51 
21. The City protested to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections 
to the statutory and master plan violations described above.52 On October 13, 1987, the 
40
 Record at 107, 181. 
46
 Record at 20. 
47
 Record at 108, 111, 133-135, 246-247. 
48
 Record at 168. 
49
 Record at 114, 1333-135, 247, 385, 308, 343, Transcript at 75-76. 
50
 Record at 168. 
51
 Record at 133-135. 
52
 Record at 27-29. 
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County Planning Commission approved the conditional Use application for the Chevron 
center, over objection by the City.53 On October 14, 19$7, Sandy City appealed that 
decision to the Salt Lake County Commission.54 On October 21, 1988, the County 
Commission denied the City's request for appeal and upheld the Planning Commission 
decision.55 
22. On October 27, 1987, the County Planning (Commission approved the use 
application for the second (McDonalds) phase.56 The Ciiy appealed that approval to the 
County Commission on November 4, 1987. On December 9, 1987, the County 
Commission denied the City's appeal and approved the conditional use application.57 
Disposition in the District Cqurt 
23. On November 6, 1987, Sandy City filed a verified complaint in Third 
District Court challenging both the rezoning and the conditional use permits.58 Such 
action was precisely the appeal process proposed by the County Attorney's Office.59 
24. By letter dated November 19, 1987, the City Attorney inquired of counsel 
for the developers, of a convenient date for deposition of developer Yeates. 
°^ Record at 115. 
54
 Record at 27. 
55
 Record at 6. 
56
 Record at 167. 
57
 Record at 249. 
58
 Record at 2 
"Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not 
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the 
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not thq half mile is applicable." Envelope 
5, Document 9, p. 1114. 
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Defendant's counsel did not respond to that inquiry.60 Instead, all defendants filed 
motions for summary judgment. On January 26, 1988, the City responded with its own 
motion for summary judgment. Motions by the City and Chevron were accompanied by 
affidavits and memoranda. The City filed a motion to strike portions of affidavits and 
other documents and filed a four page affidavit of counsel evidencing the need for 
additional discovery time.61 
25. On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions for summary judgment 
and a motion to strike. After counsel for the City had completed oral argument, coimsel 
for the County submitted several stacks of documents to the court. The County 
evidence was submitted without prior notice to the City. It was received by the Court 
over objection by the City and without a showing of good cause.62 
26. On February 25, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a motion to certify the 
record which it had filed with the Court at the hearing on summary judgment, together 
with supplemental related documents, which motion was granted.63 
27. On March 15, 1988, the Court filed its memorandum decision denying the 
City's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike and granting defendants' 
motions for summary judgment and Salt Lake County's motion for certification. On 
April 8, 1988, the Court entered its formal order and judgment of dismissal, which order 
forms the basis of this appeal.64 
60
 Record at 202. 
61
 Record at 173-178, 198-206. 
62
 Transcript at 21-30, 74-75. 
63
 Record at 225-258. 
64
 Record at 259-263. The decision and order are at Appendix "C." 
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28. On April 28, 1988, the City filed a motion for injunction during pendency 
of appeal.65 The motion was based in part on affidavits Showing that the Property 
Owners had conveyed the Property to Chevron and McDonalds after the motions for 
summary judgment had been heard66 and that development was occurring on the 
Property. That motion was denied67 and the City appealed on May 5,1988. 
Disposition before the Appeal Court 
29. On June 7, 1990, a Panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
judgment on grounds which had not been previously considered, briefed or argued.68 
The Panel found that the City had not judicially appealed the County rezoning of the 
property prior to the County's conditional use approval. A Petition for Rehearing by the 
City was denied on August 6, 1990. 
30. The City's petition for writ of certiorari was (granted on December 12, 
1991. Thereafter, the defendant property owners petitioned for annexation to Sandy 
City. All defendants except the County and its planning commission were accordingly 
dismissed from this action.69 The City asserts no further claims against the annexing 
owners. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have ruled in this action. Their 
holdings were inconsistent; however, they both have found means to summarily approve 
6 5
 Record att 334. 
66
 Record at 324,327. 
67
 Record at 339. 
The Panel's opinion is set forth in Appendix "B.M 
County Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Exhibit F. 
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development, despite the obvious issues of fact and the prohibitive statutes, ordinances 
and rules which bar such approvals. 
The Court of Appeals decision is particularly detrimental, since it departed from 
both the facts and law argued by the parties and relied on by the lower court. This 
detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted in several errors of 
fact and law which, if not corrected, will undermine effective urban planning and 
promote future litigation between local governments. 
The hesitation of these courts to address the merits of the action may have arisen 
from a belief that judgment for the City would require the developers to dismantle their 
projects. Accordingly, the City has stipulated to the dismissal of each of the private 
parties to this action, in order to avoid distraction from the critical legal and public 
policy issues which are described below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURTS MISPERCEIVED LEGISLATIVE 
INTENTS 
A. LAND USE PLANS WERE IGNORED 
The pioneering spirit which accounted for development of this country had less to 
do with individual heroic acts than with the effectiveness of clusters of people gathered 
for simple purposes. Chances of frontier survival could be measured less by loner 
courage than by how well undertakings were planned and groups were organized.70 
Boorstin, The Americans: the National Experience, pp. 51-65, 1965. Mr. Boorstin was Senior Historian 
at the Smithsonian Institution, then Librarian of Congress from 1975 to 1987, where he is now Director 
Emeritus. 
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Good planning and organizing is difficult in local (government today. Our elective 
system generates sudden changes in leadership at policymaking levels and impedes 
consistent long-term planning. State and local legislative! bodies have recognized this 
problem and, through statute and ordinance, devised wa>js to encourage sound urban 
planning. 
In Utah, most urban planning takes place on a specific, i.e., local, level. In fact, 
Utah cities are required by statute to adopt comprehensive plans for future development 
and to conform their zoning regulations to such plans.71 Sandy City has adopted such a 
plan. Even Salt Lake County, although not a municipality, has adopted an ordinance 
requiring that the development subject to this action be consistent with its master plan.72 
As discussed hereafter, the County approvals subjett of this action violated the 
County's own master plan and the City's comprehensive plan. The lower courts found 
procedural excuses for failing to consider these violations or even permit discovery 
concerning them. In so doing, they implied a simple planning model. That model casts 
land use planning as perfunctory - an academic exercise \Vithout practical significance. 
The model ignores the enormous development problems growing within our urban areas 
and the significant role planning must play in the solution to America's problems of 
pollution, overcrowding and natural resource destruction. 
Comprehensive plans are not clerical niceties -- they are necessary to sound 
urban planning. By failing to respect urban planning, the lower courts became 
instruments to undermine principles critical to the safety ahd welfare of the public. 
71
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-3, 10-9-21. See Marshall v. Salt Lake <$ty, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 711 
(1943). 
72
 Record at 22. Section 19.84.090(D), Revised Ordinances of Salt L^ke County. 
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B. PLANNING MECHANISMS WERE SUPPLANTED. 
Local government is sometimes preferred in Utah as government "close to the 
people." However, from a planning perspective, the multiplication of many local 
governments complicates coordination of development between jurisdictions. 
Interlocal coordination of urban planning has been addressed differently by state. 
Devices which have been used include: (1) regional planning commissions; (2) 
extraterritorial control by cities; (3) intergovernmental agreements; (4) governmental 
consolidation; (5) special service districts; and (6) annexation.73 
In 1979, the Utah Legislature selected municipal annexation as the principle 
means of solving this coordination problem. It declared that cities should provide urban 
services to developing areas and that annexation is the means by which those services 
should be extended.74 The Legislature also determined that islands of unincorporated 
territory surrounded by municipal boundaries are impediments to sound service delivery 
and should be annexed to cities.75 
In embracing annexation as a development process, the Legislature also granted 
cities two additional tools for coordinating development, both of which involve 
extraterritorial control. First, city annexations must be preceded by a "policy 
declaration" or plan applying state standards in determining the unincorporated areas 
best suited for annexation and development.76 Second, counties and special districts are 
expressly prohibited from approving urban development in any such planned area if it is 
Goodman, Principles and Practice of Urban Planning, pp. 32-36, (1968). 
74
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401. 
75
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(5) and 10-2-417(1)(d). 
76
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-414. 
18 
within one-half mile of a city.77 
This combination of advance planning, extraterritorial control, and municipal 
annexation, are the means the state has provided to coordinate development between 
local governments. They are not academic exercises; thei Legislature has determined 
that they are practical and necessary to sound urban development.78 
In this case, the lower courts effectively vitiated Legislative development controls 
by approving large scale urban development within an imincorporated island of Sandy 
City lying within the area of the City's annexation plan, tliese decisions not only 
slighted City and County master plans, they also vitiated interlocal coordination. This 
failure to uphold planning statutes and ordinances offend^ Legislative prerogatives and 
leave local governments without mechanisms needed to effect approved principles of 
sound urban development. 
C FAULTY GOVERNANCE MODELS WEI^E EMBRACED 
Salt Lake County contends that it is a "defacto city1*79 and that it has all the 
powers of a city.80 The Court of Appeals embraced this model, assuming that powers of 
cities and counties are interchangeable and freely apply provisions of the Utah 
Municipal Code to County procedures. These conclusions I about the nature of Utah 
local government and their powers are superficial and erroneous. 
" UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-418. 
/ 0
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401. The Legislature is hostile to thejuse of certain other development 
coordination devices such as "the proliferation of special service districts. Id. 
County Brief in Mountain States, at 23. 
Of) 
County Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 8,(footnote 5. 
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Cities have broad powers to deliver and finance municipal services ~ counties do 
not. There are historic differences in the roles of cities and counties.81 Rural areas 
generally take the name of county or township and are chiefly administrative 
subdivisions of the state.82 The Utah legislature assigns cities a very different role ~ that 
of urban service delivery. Cities are expected to annex all of the urbanized 
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities in order that full urban services can 
be efficiently delivered: 
Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services 
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of public 
health, safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial areas, 
and in areas undergoing development. 
* * * 
Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized 
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities . . ,83 
Salt Lake County recognizes that it lacks the powers of a city - but claims such 
powers anyway. It argues that it is a "defacto city" and on this basis has entered into 
competition with local cities for delivery of municipal services. Serious 
intergovernmental conflicts result from this practice. They include the following: 
1. Service Delivery Impediments. Despite its lack of municipal powers, Salt 
Lake County has elected to sponsor large-scale unincorporated development - often 
along and within city boundaries and islands. Because cities cannot annex so as to 
create more unincorporated islands,84 county-approved developments, which resist 
annexation, can restrict annexation along the entire length of a city boundary. 
81
 Mountain States, supra. 
82
 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 22 (3d ed. 1988). 
83
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(2), (5). 
84
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-417(l)(d). 
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The impact of County competition for territorial control of development is 
probably best illustrated in Sandy City's own erratic boundaries and in the numerous 
unincorporated islands within that City. 
J-215 
SANDY CITY BOUNDARY MAP 
jyyJlSLANDS TO BE ANNEXED IF PETITIONED 
V7. 
AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED IF PETITIONED 
w, | ] IN DISPUTE 
85 
The urban development which is subject to this actidn was approved by the 
County within one of these unincorporated islands and is marked in red above. There is 
an obvious inefficiency of servicing central Sandy locations from remote County 
facilities. This practice also encourages developers to shop within such islands for the 
85
 Record at 25. 
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most attractive zoning and development standards ~ annexing where city standards are 
favorable and "going unincorporated" where, as in most cases, County standards are 
lower. As this process occurs, power over local planning subtly shifts into private hands 
where interests are largely site-specific. The long-term effect is ad hoc planning and 
frustration of the objectives of local communities as they try to plan for its growth and 
efficiently deliver services to their citizens. 
When developers are able to pit cities against the County along municipal 
boundaries to see which will offer the lowest development standard in exchange for tax 
base, comprehensive urrban planning is destroyed. Uses of land, such as those at issue, 
which do not conform to the comprehensive plans of the community, have been a source 
of deep concern to legislators and planners. These nonconforming uses limit the 
effectiveness of land-use controls and share responsibility for the blight which has 
infected many urban areas.86 Municipal attorneys,87 urban planners,88 and law review 
commentators89 agree that nonconforming uses imperil the success of community plans 
and injure property values. 
1 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Vol. 1, p. 357 (2d ed.). 
87 
Messer, Non-conprming Uses, Municipalities and the Law in Action, at 347 (1951). 
oo 
Lewis, A New Zoning Plan pr the District of Columbia, at 112 (1956). 
QQ 
Young, Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 Western Reserve Law Review 681 (1961); 
Comment, 7 Baylor Law Review 73 (1955); Comment, 102 University of Pennsylvania 91 (1953); Comment, 1 
Buffalo Law Review 286 (1952); Comment, 9 University of Chicago Law Review All (1942); Mendelker, 
Prolonging the Nonconforming Use; Judicial Restriction on the Power to Zone in Iowa, 8 Drake Law Review 
23 (1958); Norton, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses and Structures, 20 Law & Contemporary Problems 
305 (1955); O'Reilly, The Nonconforming Use and Due Process of Law, 23 Georgetown Law Journal 218 
(1935); Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent Domain, BYU Journal of Legal Studies, 151 
(1979). 
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2, Service District Proliferation. Additional problems result from County 
development policies. The county lacks the constitutional and statutory authority of a 
city and can't meet the full service demands of unincorporated areas. So it has 
encouraged the creation of special purpose districts to help compete with cities for 
development. 
The proliferation of special districts defeats representative government. Districts 
exercise limited functions and operate apart from generall units of government. The 
territorial jurisdiction of districts often overlap, creating difficult problems particularly in 
metropolitan areas.90 For these reasons, special district governance has been aptly 
termed the "new dark continent of American politics."91 
The Salt Lake Valley poses the most serious problem in Utah. At least twelve 
full-function cities and towns exist in the valley. Salt Lake County also engages in the 
delivery of municipal services. Nevertheless, at least nineteen special purpose districts 
have been organized to duplicate municipal functions and complicate the local 
government puzzle: 
The anomalous result is the existence of thirty-one units of local 
government attempting to meet the needs of an areja whose topography is 
uniform and whose population is constantly becoming more evenly 
distributed as suburbanization makes its rapid advance.92 
3. Taxation Excesses and Inequities. Taxation excesses are of paramount 
public concern. The roots of local taxation problems lie within this maze of 
governments and service delivery roles: 
90
 Robert W. Swensen, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II, 1985 tjtah Law Review 1, 48. 
91
 See discussion in Benson, "Special Districts and Deficient Local Government in the Salt Lake 
Metropolitan Area," 7 Utah Law Review 209, 212-126 (1960). 
92
 Id. 
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Are there any logical bases for dividing into special districts 
governmental functions and responsibilities in a relatively compact area 
such as the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, where nearly half of Utah's 
population is concentrated? A few examples from the report of the Local 
Government Survey Commission, which recently completed a factual study 
of local government structure in Utah, provide the obvious answer. 
Unnecessary expenses are incurred because special districts employ their 
own legal counsel, thereby duplicating functions of the city or county 
attorney's office. Expenses are further increased because there is no 
central purchasing authority, and, consequently, none of the economies of 
large-scale purchasing are realized. Duplicate purchases of equipment and 
the necessary maintenance facilities as well as duplication of personnel 
also increase costs. Taxpayers in some instances are subject simultaneously 
to as many as five local government authorities. In such confusion 
taxpayers sometimes do not even receive the specific service the district is 
supposed to provide. For example, in the suburban area southeast of Salt 
Lake City, taxpayers have to purchase water from ten private water 
companies, as well as from Salt Lake City, and at the same time are taxed 
by the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, from which they 
receive no water. The compilers of the report felt that the latter situation 
was "close to double taxation," and the inequality of the situation does 
seem obvious."93 
In 1979, the Utah Legislature declared its intention to eliminate these 
governmental disorders in the following statement of policy. 
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that: 
(1) Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic 
development of this state; 
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services 
essential pr sound urban development and pr the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial areas, and in 
areas undergoing development; 
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with specific 
standards, to include areas where a higi quality of urban governmental 
services is needed and can be provided pr the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation and the 
proliferation of special service districts; 
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate 
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing 
municipality, subject to Section 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the 
annexation; 
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized 
id., at 212. 
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unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents 
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government; 
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban 
development need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of 
the proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other 
governmental entities, on the need for and cost of local government 
services and the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, 
and on factors related to population growth and density and the geography 
of the area; and 
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries ate of concern to citizens 
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state 
responsibility. 
This important policy directly addresses the problem of competition by counties 
for new development. It emphasized that urban development is the responsibility of 
municipalities, which have the statutory authority to provide a full range of urban 
services. Municipal annexation is defined as the means to promote such policy and 
eliminate the evils of service district proliferation and doulble taxation. 
This policy was accompanied by the introduction td a comprehensive planning 
law. This new law was unlike prior planning statutes in tliat it finally addressed the 
problem of competition between cities and counties for urban development. Central to 
that new law is §10-2-418, which states that "[u]rban develbpment shall not be approved 
or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."94 
The effect of this statute is to restrict counties from) expanding their tax base 
adjacent to cities and in unincorporated islands and thus reopen such territories to 
annexation. Although this policy does not implement all a$pects of legislative policy in a 
single stroke, it at least limits growth of the problem and begins a critical evolution away 
"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases." UTAH CODE ANN.I 10-1-104(11). 
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from self-destructive intergovernmental competition. 
Salt Lake County rejects responsibility for the governance confusion which afflict 
the Salt Lake Valley. It contends that it has all the powers of a city and shows no 
inclination to bend to the spirit or the letter of the Urban Development Statute. It 
intends to continue fighting city development. Its principle stratagem is to denude the 
urban development statute by means of a restrictive definition of "development." 
Obviously, revenue-conscious counties can't be expected to enforce the urban 
development statute on their own.95 To be effective, this restriction must be judicially 
honored. Without such aid from the courts, legislative intentions will be vitiated while 
service delivery is retarded, urban planning is frustrated, service districts proliferate, and 
taxation inequities continue unabated. 
The Appeal Court Panel missed the distinction between cities and counties. In 
fact, it applied the Utah Municipal Code to county rezonings. It further ruled that cities 
cannot object to county approval of urban development adjacent to their boundaries 
unless they have previously exhausted an attack on the underlying zoning.96 
The Panel misconstrued the record in concluding that the City did not appeal the 
County's rezoning decision.97 It also made legal errors. But, most important, the 
decision bypassed the opportunity to support statutes and legislative policies which hold 
the key to sound development. Instead, the Panel effectively redefined the urban 
development statute to permit any unincorporated development on previously zoned 
y5
 See Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738 (Utah 1977) (tendency of county to maximize 
revenues in its own self-interest). 
96
 Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 491 (Utah App. 1990). 
See discussion under Point III. 
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land regardless of its cost or scale. 
Cities presented with this new requirement will t>3 powerless to comply, since 
most county lands are already zoned. Even with new zoijing proposals, the development 
is often not defined so as to give cities a factual basis upon which to conclude that costs 
will exceed the $750,000 jurisdictional limit. Cities will, rievertheless, be required to file 
suit against most county rezonings in order to preserve their rights to question 
subsequent development approvals. 
The Panel's misperceptions creates impossible banters to enforcement of the 
urban development statute in a manner which robs it of its intended meaning. The 
effect of its decision is to undo the express language of a statute of critical importance 
to the welfare of our state. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING COUNTY 
DEVELOPMENT APPROVALS 
A. STATUTES WERE MISCONSTRUED 
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-2-418, strictly limits Comity approval of urban 
development within one-half mile of a city in unincorporatjed territory which the city has 
proposed for annexation in its policy declaration. That statute states: 
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile 
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed pr municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if the municipality 
is willing to annex the territory proposed pr such development under the 
standards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that 
a property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said 
one-half mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and 
identify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an 
annexation to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from 
the filing with the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and 
diligent effort by said property owner to annex, said (property owner may 
develop as otherwise permitted by law. [Emphasis acjded] 
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The above statute prohibits county approval of unincorporated "urban 
development" if 1) it is within one-half mile of Sandy City, 2) the City has proposed the 
area for expansion in its policy declaration, and 3) Sandy is willing to annex the territory 
proposed for the development. 
It is undisputed that the Property in this action is within one-half mile of Sandy 
and that Sandy has proposed the area for expansion in its policy declaration.98 The 
district court, nevertheless, erroneously concluded that the Property could be developed 
without annexing under the following reasoning: 
"Willingness" of City to Annex The District Court erroneously concluded that 
§10-2-418 requires a City to publicly declare its "willingness" to annex a property in 
advance of annexation." However, the statute does not require such a declaration. All 
it requires is that the City be "willing to annex the territory proposed for [urban] 
development under the standards and requirements set prth in this chapter" 
The phrase "under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter" 
modifies the phrase "willing to annex" and no other modification of the phrase "willing 
to annex" appears in the provision. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature did not her 
impose upon cities an affirmative duty to express formally by specific city ordinance or 
otherwise a willingness to annex The Legislature simply requires that cities be willing 
to annex according to state annexation standards. 
This brief later demonstrates that the City repeatedly declared its willingness to 
annex the Property. However, such was not required. Further, by ignoring the plain 
98
 Record at 34. 
99
 Record at 260. 
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wording of the statute, the district court created a barrier i to annexation by other cities 
which was never intended by the legislature. In so doing, lit erred as a matter of law 
which error requires reversal on appeal. 
Definition of "Urban Development." The District Court also concluded that 
annexation was not required because the Property was notl "urban development." 
"Urban development" is also defined in statute. Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) defines the term as follows: 
" . . . a housing subdivision involving more than 15 residential units with an 
average of less than one acre per residential unit or a commercial or 
industrial development for which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any 
or all phases." 
The District Court erred twice in its construction of| this statute. First, the Court 
assumed that the value of building fixtures should not be considered in determining cost 
projections. Second, the court erroneously assumed that 0ach pad within a project 
constitutes a separate development. 
Costs for a "development" include all expenses from Hand acquisition to the 
finished project. The Utah Supreme Court has defined th^ term "develop" to mean "the 
converting of a tract of land into an area suitable for residential or business uses."100 In 
fact, "development" includes "any or all undertakings necess|ary for planning, land 
acquisition, demolition, construction, or equipment of a project"™ 
The district court's rejection of fixtures as development costs excludes many true 
expenses of the Chevron Service Center including installation of curb, guttering and 
sidewalks, underground fuel storage tanks, petroleum piping and monitoring systems, 
100
 Scheller v. Dixie Six Corporation, 753 P.2d 971. 
Dumonuchel Dictionary of Development Terminology. 1975 [emphasis added]. 
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construction of a carwash, finishing, equipping, landscaping and installing sprinkling 
systems, signing and lighting, hard surfacing, etc. 
The court's suggestion that development costs include only building shells is also 
inconsistent with Utah law and appraisal practices which have long included true fixtures 
as a part of realty. In order to ascertain whether an improvement has been made to 
real estate, courts look to whether there has been an annexation to the land, or to some 
part of the realty; or a fixture appurtenant to it, and whether it was done with the 
intention of making it a permanent part thereof.102 
The court also directly contridicted the statute in concluding that only the first 
phase of a development in calculating total development costs. The statutory definition 
of "urban development" includes "all phases" of a development. In including "all phases" 
in the definition, the legislature wisely anticipated the kind of development being 
considered in this case-one which is developed in multiple phases. This language is 
designed to prevent a developer, as in this case, from circumventing the development 
statute by simply segmenting or timing his projects. 
B. FICTIONS WERE INDULGED 
Judge Uno's Memorandum Decision did not just misconstrue the law. It relied 
on a series of four express misstatements of fact as follows: 
1. Master Plan. 
The district court concluded that "Salt Lake County Commission acted properly in 
rezoning the property in question, and was not in violation of any county ordinance or 
Daniels v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan, 111 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily and capriciously"™3 This conclusion 
contradicts the undisputed record. The County approved Commercial zoning in an area 
designated by its master plan for "rural residential uses." |The County's own ordinance 
specifically requires compliance with that plan. That ordinance states: 
"The planning commission shall not authorize a conditional use permit 
unless the evidence presented is such as to establish . . . [t]hat the 
proposed use will conform to the intent of the county master plan." 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the failure of an agency of government 
to conform its official actions to its own regulations is arbitrary and capricious. The 
Court has said: 
Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely "guidelines," but 
administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and 
cannot be ignored by the agency to suite its own purposes. Such is the 
essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for 
not following its rules, an agency must be held to tltiem.104 
The deputy county attorney advised the County Commission that "conditional uses 
need be consistant always with the master plan."105 That advice was ignored. The 
County's failure to require compliance with its master plar}, in the face of clear evidence 
of noncompliance, was the essence of capriciousness and i^  the cause of this otherwise 
unnecessary legal action. The district court's conclusion to| the contrary is purely 
fictional. 
2. Willingness to Annex. 
The district court erred in concluding that "Sandy C t^y has not clearly stated it 
would annex the subject property." Assuming arguendo that such a declaration is 
103
 Record at 259. 
104
 State, Etc. v. Uu 
105
 Record at 243. 
tah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980). 
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required, the Court of Appeals in this action refutes that conclusion. It recognized that 
the City had posed at least two bases on which to show "willingness:" (1) promulgating a 
general policy declaration indicating its willingness to annex the property, if petitioned, 
along with twenty other parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement to the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission that it was willing to annex the property."106 
The evidence referenced by the court of appeals was before the district court in 
this action. The City's declaration could not be clearer or more specific. The City 
directly and publicly reiterated its willingness to annex the entire 4.18 acre tract: 
Walter Miller, Sandy City Attorney, expressed thoughts on 
annexation of properties within a mile of a city, etc. He stated that the 
project is in excess of $750,000 and Sandy City is willing to annex this 
territory. If the applicant had petitioned Sandy pr annexation they would 
have accepted, but he did not and this is a major concerrn for the City 
from a legal as well as a planning point of view.107 
The district court's conclusion that no willingness was expressed offends the 
express language of the statute which requires no such expression. It also contradicts 
the record on appeal which demonstrates at least two discrete occasions when the City 
publicly declared its willingness. Assertions to the contrary by the district court cannot 
be supported legally or factually and are entirely fictional. 
3. Development Costs. 
Sandy introduced, before the district court, an appraisal by a licensed MAI 
showing costs of "development" exceeded $750,000. The County's own Director of 
Development Services confirmed that development costs for the Property would exceed 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Record at 109, 246. 
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the $750,000 figure.108 The District Court ignored this expert testimony by pretending 
that costs of development relate only to the shell of buildings. It stated that "[tjhe value 
of the fixtures and personal property should not be considered [in determining 
development costs]." 
At hearings before the County Commission, counsel Ifor the County repeatedly 
referred to its improvements as "fixtures" and "fixture costs.? This is undoubtedly 
because they help to make the building "operational." Salt Lake County appraises 
improvements as part of its tax appraisals on homes and other real property. It sees no 
reason to exclude the value of fixtures from such real estate appraisals and there is no 
reason to exclude such here. 
The court should not have permitted the County to alternate between restrictive 
and expansive standards of real estate appraisal, in each case simply to maximize its tax 
revenues. Where improvements have been affixed to property in order to render it 
operational, such fixtures should be included in the costs of (development. 
4. Scope of Development. 
The district court also triedd to limit the scope of th^ development to the 
Chevron phase alone in order to lower the calculation of development costs. It stated 
that "[t]he application of Chevron should be considered a siftgle development." The 
record does not support this conclusion. 
There is no evidence that the Chevron phase was platted separately from the 
balance of the subdivision. On the contrary, the facts before the court were that the 
whole 4.18 acres were under single ownership and that the ^ntire tract, including 
Record at 111. Also envelope 4, docuument 6, p. 13. 
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Chevron and McDonalds, was a single "commercial subdivision." The owners of the 
entire tract promised the public that they would be the sole developers of the project 
and that all construction would proceed as a single development.109 
Chevron did not acquire ownership of the parcel until approximately five months 
after the conditional use permit was approved.110 Motions for summary judgment had 
been heard one month prior to conveyance to Chevron. Chevron impliedly admits that 
it did not acquire control over the design and development of its station until that 
time.111 
The district court had no factual basis to conclude that the Chevron Center was a 
seperate development from the rest of the site. Its decision should be reversed. 
C. DISCOVERY WAS NOT PERMITTED 
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted when the nonmoving 
party has not completed discovery because further discovery may disclose issues of 
material facts sufficient to defeat the motion.112 
The party opposing summary judgment must file an affidavit evidencing the need 
for further discovery.113 The City filed the affidavit of its counsel with the trial court 
previous to the hearing on the motions for summary judgment. The four-page affidavit 
and exhibit stated, among other things, that the City was unable, after request, to take 
l u y
 Record at 245. 
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 Record at 343. See also, envelope 4, #3. 
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 Chevron appeal brief, p. 18. 
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 Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1977); Calliouxv. Progressive 
Insurance, 745 P. 2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). 
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 Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1987). 
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the deposition of the defendants and was unable, after several requests, to obtain a 
certified copy of certain County Commission minutes. Th0 affidavit stated further the 
precise issues of material fact the City expected to discover.114 
The district court refused to permit the City to take depositions of defendants or 
conduct other discovery as requested by the City through Affidavit of its counsel under 
authority of Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court abused its 
discretion in granting the Appellees' motion for summary judgment in view of the City's 
detailed affidavit. This error alone is sufficient to justify reversal the district court's 
ruling. 
POINT III 
THE APPEAL COURT PANEL ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISTRICT COURT 
A. AN ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW WAS APPLIED 
1. The Panel Failed to Recognize the Jurisdictional Nature of the Urban 
Development Statute. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-2-418 (1986) states that "Ju]rban development shall not 
be approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated 
area which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration." "Urban development" is defined to include "a| commercial or industrial 
development for which cost projections exceed $750,000 foif any or all phases."115 
The central issue in this action has been whether re$pondents' development 
exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the County of Approval authority. The 
County Director of Development Services, testifying before | the Planning Commission, 
114
 Record at 198-203. A copy of the affidavit is at Appendix "D." 
115
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986). 
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confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will exceed the $750,000 figure."116 
Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that their costs for just the first two 
pads was $760,000.117 A later MAI appraisal showed that the costs of the entire 
development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development restriction,118 
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this 
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. Despite the testimony of 
the developers and its own staff, it found that development costs were less than 
$750,000. 
On appeal, the Panel acknowledged that it could consider whether the County 
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.119 It 
cited Na)lor v. Salt Lake City Corporation™0 for the proposition that the Panel should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue. 
The Naylor case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of 
the City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he 
statutory authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and 
amending the same is not questioned" in that case.121 The Naylor court merely 
confirmed that courts should not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative 
discretion. 
116
 Record at 111. 
117
 Record at 108. 
118
 Record at 133-135. 
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 Opinion, p. 11. 
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 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965). 
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 Id.y at p. 28. 
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2. The Court Applied a Standard of Review Applicable to Discretionary 
Decisions by Local Governments and Not to Questions of Local Government 
Jurisdiction. 
Statutory authority is the central issue in this appeal. Jurisdictional issues are not 
discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place wthere the County lacks 
authority to act. The Utah Supreme Court has confirmed I that review latitude is 
recognized only where counties act within their authority: 
"County zoning authorities are bound by the [terms and standards of 
the applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or 
deny conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within 
the boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority 
is afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a 
strong presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, 
courts will not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, 
unreasonable or an abuse of discretion."122 
The review standard applied by the Panel reverses the proper role of the courts. 
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, th^y become the validators of 
the same. It permits administrative agencies to define theft own powers in the face of 
evidence which consistently denies them such powers. The Panel could not have 
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests 
that this Court consider the review standard the Panel so broadly applied in this appeal. 
B. NONAPPLICABLE STATUTES WERE HELD DETERMINATIVE 
1. The Municipal Code has No Application Whatsoever to County Rezonings. 
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code as a basis 
for its refusal to review the merits of this appeal. These statutes have no application to 
this appeal for the following reasons: 
122
 Thurston v. Cache Ctyf 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. 
Board of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Coilrt made clear that deference will 
be granted under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower] agency was "acting within the 
scope of its authority." 
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UTAH CODE ANN. Si 0-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a basis for 
its conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.123 This 
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to 
city board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials.124 It has nothing 
to do with County zonings whatsoever. The County has its own zoning statutes which 
differ from those applicable to cities.125 
The respective statutes dealing with cities and counties are not interchangeable. 
The Legislature and Supreme Court have been continuously clear "that the respective 
statutes dealing with cities and counties confer different powers."126 The Utah Municipal 
Code should not be applied to county zonings.127 
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. 
It addresses only to appeals from enprcement decisions and does not authorize the 
board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones themselves. Further, this section does 
not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals. It is facially inapplicable to this 
action and should not be used as the basis to avoid consideration of the merits of this 
appeal. 
UTAH CODE ANN. Si 0-9-15. This statute was also apparently used to establish 
that the City had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's 
123
 Opinion, p. 43. 
124
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-6(2) and 10-9-9(1). 
125
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-1 et seq. 
Mountain States, supra, 
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 See Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where the Court of 
Appeals rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to 
municipal planning matters. 
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rezoning.128 This section does set a 30-day appeal period -+ but it is for appealing 
decisions by city boards of adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part 
of the Utah Municipal Code and applies only to cities. Cdunties are not municipalities 
for the purposes of the Code and this section has nothing tjo do with County zoning 
decisions whatsoever.129 Even if it did apply to counties, it I does not purport to establish 
a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning decisions. 
2. The Board of Adjustment Statutes Relied on by the Court Have Do Not 
Govern Rezoning Decisions by Elected County Officials. 
Section 17-27-16 of the enabling act for counties wai also cited by the Panel to 
establish that an appeal from a zoning decision must be made within the time and 
according to the procedure specified by the board of county commissioners.130 As 
discussed in Section C below, the City precisely followed Cbunty directions in appealing 
the rezoning decision. 
Section 17-27-16 actually provides a procedure for appealing alleged errors in 
zoning enforcement decisions to the board of adjustment. tThe record does not disclose 
whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board of adjustment. If it has, that 
board does not review rezonings.131 Its powers are expressly limited to considering 
alleged errors "in the enprcemerU of the zoning resolution."132 
The City does not challenge zoning enprcemerU. It attacks the jurisdiction of the 
128 Opinion, p. 39. 
129
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1). 
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 Opinion, footnote 1. 
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 Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in 
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County to adopt the zone itself. Such challenges to the validity of ordinances do not 
require appeal to the board of adjustment: 
Since the board of adjustment does not have the authority to 
invalidate ordinances, challenges to the validity of ordinances do not 
require appeal to the board of adjustment. Such appeal would be futile 
and therefore unnecessary.133 
Section 17-27-16 has no application to the County's rezoning decision and should 
not have been applied to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal.134 
C. THE FACTUAL RECORD WAS MISSTATED 
1. Objections to Rezoning. The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that 
Sandy objected to the County's rezoning but erroneously states that "there is no dispute 
that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezoning" pursuant to §17-27-16. That conclusion 
arose partly from the lack of briefing or argument and the misconstruction of §17-27-16 
discussed above. However, a misunderstanding of the factual record is also implied in 
the conclusion. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that (1) the City raised its development 
objections prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was 
not available to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the 
City's objection; (3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may 
violate urban development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the 
property, deferring its decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the 
development until a specific development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested 
Summary of Utah Law: Land Use, Zoning and Eminent Domain, Brigham Young University Journal 
of Legal Studies, at 207, (1979). 
134
 Thurston, supra, p. 446, confirms that the board of adjustment is not "the exclusive repository of 
appellate powers." 
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reconsideration of the County's decision; (6) the request fdr zoning reconsideration was 
denied and the City was directed to pursue its objection through the conditional use 
process; (7) the City complied with the County's direction and fully participated at all 
stages of the conditional use process as defined by ordinance; and (8) through this 
action, the City timely appealed both the rezoning and conditional use permits in the 
manner defined by the County Attorney. 
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections 0r untimely in appealing this 
development. The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative 
appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by! the County to the City orally 
in the record and by ordinance. The City followed all those procedures and made its 
objections in a timely fashion at each stage. 
Where the parties have agreed on an appeal procediire which is consistent with 
all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes unfairness to refuse rudimentary 
discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis that an alternative procedure 
was not selected. The Court would advance justice by providing the same presumption 
to the County's defined grievance procedure as the Panel dM to all other aspects of the 
County's decisions. The Panel's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record 
of these events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process. 
2. Adequacy of County Findings. 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County 
had made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."135 This 
conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that 
Opinion, p. 14. 
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development costs for the site would exceed $750,000: 
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County 
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to 
day, however, the value of the development is determined when the 
building permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people 
to purchase a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid 
annexation. In this particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire 
site is developed it will exceed the $750,000 figure. This legal issue will have 
to be addressed with the cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy 
City."136 
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that 
their costs for just the first two of numerous building pads was $760,000.137 No evidence 
was introduced to refute this testimony.138 The County's findings therefore directly 
contradict the undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was 
misplaced. The court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts 
contained in the record on appeal. 
Point IV 
PUBLIC POLICY MITIGATES FOR REVERSAL OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
The following are among the numerous public policy factors which each mitigate 
in favor of summary judgment for the City: 
1. Respect of Legislative Prerogatives. The Utah Legislature has expressed 
its desire to strictly limit urban development in unincorporated areas surrounding cities. 
136
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The reasons for these restrictions are express and sound. They include the fact that (1) 
cities are created to provide the high quality of urban governmental services needed for 
sound development139 - counties are not; (2) development within the unincorporated 
areas of the county is a cause of "double taxation" of city residents, an "inequity" which 
the Legislature is attempting to eliminate;140 and (3) because counties are not 
empowered to provide full urban services, unincorporated development encourages the 
"proliferation of special service districts," which activity the Legislature is likewise 
attempting to discourage.141 
Because county governments are less able to regulate urban development, 
developers have commonly sought to develop in unincorporated areas, thus avoiding 
more comprehensive review of their projects. Salt Lake Gbunty has encouraged such 
developments because development enlarges county tax base, patronage, and political 
influence. However, such activities are directly contrary to I the legislative policy 
expressed in the statutes discussed above. 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaldng requires that the 
judiciary support enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded only in 
policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate 
a legitimate objective.142 Respect for legislative intentions tnitigates in favor of a ruling 
requiring the developers and county to comply with the urtyan development restrictions 
of state statute. 
139
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2. Balancing of Interests. Defendants' development does not just bring into 
conflict the interests of Salt Lake County and Sandy City. Their development is posed 
directly adjacent to residential neighborhoods where residents and property owners have 
met and expressed strong views both for and against the development. Further, the 
property abuts two major arterial streets, and thus poses potential traffic problems for 
both Sandy City and Salt Lake County. 
Orderly administrative procedures, whose proper purpose is the final settlement 
of controversies, is favored by the courts.143 State statute provides a process whereby 
such disputes may be resolved -- it begins with the annexation process. Through that 
process, public hearings are held, citizens are heard, service delivery efficiencies can be 
maximized, and competing interests can be accommodated. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that city government is an appropriate forum 
for balancing interests and resolving disputes between residents and developers.144 This 
Court should likewise give deference to the statutory annexation process in order that 
these policies may be effectuated. 
3. Balance of Powers Principles. The Utah Supreme Court has asked trial 
courts to refer questions, that are properly committed to other branches of government, 
to the appropriate administrative process, in order that the powers of other branches of 
government will not be impinged.145 The process which has been defined for resolving 
this dispute is the annexation process. 
Bandy v. Century Equipment Co., Inc, 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) 
Lovdand v. Orem City, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 2, 7 (1987) 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 65 Utah Advance Reports 8, 11-12 (1987) 
44 
This Court will promote balance of powers principles by requiring defendants' 
compliance with the annexation process, which process is defined and executed through 
the legislative powers of this state.146 
CONCLUSION 
The following relief is requested: 
1. For the reasons set forth above, as a matter of law, summary judgment 
should not have been granted in favor of defendants. This) action should, therefore, be 
reversed on appeal and remanded to the district court in order that discovery may 
proceed. 
2. The Appeal Court Panel's detour from the relfining process of briefing and 
argument resulted in several errors of fact and law. That decision should be vacated. 
3. Important questions of municipal law and urban development policy 
remain which should be settled. The Supreme Court should rule on the obligation of 
Salt Lake County to abide by the urban development statute and its own master plan. 
The Court should also correct Panel's statement of the staiidard of review as applied to 
County urban development decisions. 
•p 
DATED this W _ day of March, 1991. 
Freeman v. Centerville City, 600 P.2d 1003,1004 (Utah 1979) 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upoh 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom bi 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on 
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in control 
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; del 
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cerL 
tiffed copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supl 
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to inl 
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro[ 
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall bi 
entered against him. . 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing thi 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or ma> 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obi 
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule! 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em] 
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidaJ 
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorJ 
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdi-
vision of the State of Utah; Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission; K. De-
lyn Yeates; R. Scott Priest; W. Scott 
Kjar; Steven E. Smoot; Postero-Bleck-
er, Inc.; and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 880429-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 7, 1990. 
Municipal corporation brought action 
against county, developers and property 
owners challenging issuance of conditional 
use permit to allow service station to be 
built on rezoned property. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. 
Uno, J., dismissed city's action, and city 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., 
held that allowing administrative record to 
be submitted at hearing for motion for 
summary judgment rather than beforehand 
was not abuse of discretion; (2) affidavits 
produced in support of motion for summa-
ry judgment had adequate evidentiary 
foundations; (3) city was not entitled to 
motion for continuance to obtain further 
discovery; and (4) as result of failure to 
object to urban development at time of 
zoning determination, city was precluded 
from raising issue on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, J., concurred in result. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1), 1024.4 
In reviewing summary judgment, ap-
pellate court considers evidence in light 
most favorable to losing party and affirms 
only if it appears that no genuine dispute 
exists as to any material issues of fact or, 
if moving party is entitled to judgment as 
matter of law, even according to facts as 
contended by losing party. 
2. Zoning and Planning <3=»618 
Courts of law cannot substitute judg-
ment in area of zoning regulations for that 
of municipality's governing body. 
3. Zoning and Planning <3^601, 614 
Courts will not consider wisdom, neces-
sity, or advisability or otherwise interfere 
with municipality's zoning determination 
unless it is shown that no reasonable basis 
to justify action taken exists. 
4. Zoning and Planning <3=>642 
If administrative record of zoning pro-
cedure has been preserved, matter will be 
reviewed on record and de novo trial is 
inappropriate. U.C.A.1953, 10-9-15. 
5. Zoning and Planning <s>625 
Any error in admitting administrative 
record of zoning procedure during hearing 
on motion for summary judgment, rather 
than before, was harmless because record 
was essentially cumulative with respect to 
evidence already before court. 
6. Zoning and Planning <s=>643 
Admitting administrative record of 
zoning procedure at time of trial was with-
in discretion of trial court, absent showing 
that party lacked actual notice and time to 
prepare to meet questions raised by admit-
ted documents. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 6(d). 
7. Judgment ^185.1(8) 
Affidavit which does not meet require-
ments for admission as evidence is subject 
to motion to strike since inadmissible evi-
SANDY CITY v. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Cite as 794 P2d 482 (UtahApp. 1990) 
Utah 483 
dence cannot be considered in ruling on 
motion for summary judgment. Rules Civ. 
Proa, Rules 6(d), 56, 56(e). 
8. Judgment <S=>185.3(1) 
Affidavits presented by county in sup-
port of granting conditional use permit 
were admissible as portions of administra-
t e record before county planning commis-
sion and were not subject to motion to 
strike. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e, f); 
Rules of Evid., Rules 902(4), 1005. 
9. Judgment e=>186 
Motions under rule allowing court to 
continue summary judgment motions to 
permit moving party to obtain further dis-
covery should be granted liberally to pro-
vide adequate opportunity for any genuine 
;ssues of fact to be discovered; further 
discovery, however, will not be allowed if 
^arties did not diligently pursue discovery. 
Ilules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(f). 
10. Judgment <s=>186 
In order to be entitled to continuance 
of summary judgment motion to complete 
discovery, movant must file affidavit to 
preserve contention that judgment should 
be delayed pending further discovery, 
vvhich affidavit must explain how request-
ed continuance would aid opposition to 
summary judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
56(f). 
11. Judgment <3=>186 
Evidence presented in affidavit in sup-
port of motion to continue summary judg-
ment motion to allow further discovery in-
dicated further discovery would produce 
only cumulative evidence and that movant 
lacked due diligence, and, thus, movant 
was not entitled to continuance. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(f). 
12. Zoning and Planning <&=>644 
Evidence in zoning record supported 
findings that projected cost of development 
project and proposed development were in 
compliance with county master plan and 
county ordinances. 
13. Zoning and Planning <3=»572 
Even though city in master policy dec-
laration had indicated interest in annexing 
property if property owners petitioned, 
property owners! never petitioned nor did 
city attempt to alnnex property on its own, 
and, thus, city was precluded from raising 
annexation issueL U.C.A.1953, 10-2-414, 
10-2-418, 10-9-9. 
14. Zoning and Planning <3=>572 
Municipal corporation failed to object 
to urban development at time zoning deter-
mination was maae and, thus, was preclud-
ed from challeng ng issuance of conditional 
use permit under development. U.C.A. 
1953, 10-1-104, ip-l-104(ll), 10-2-414, 10-
2-418. 
Walter R. Millar, Sandy, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Brinton R. Bui-bidge, Kirton, McConkie 
& Bushnell, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
and appellees Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot 
and Postero-Bleqker, Inc 
Leonard J. LeWis, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellee Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc 
Kent S. Lewis, ISalt Lake City, for defen-
dant and appelle^ Salt Lake County. 
Before BENCKf, GARFF and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judgef 
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial 
court's dismissal of its action against de-
fendants Salt Lake County, property own-
ers Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot, and 
developers Posterp-Blecker, Inc. (Postero-
Blecker) and Chevron USA, Inc. (Chevron). 
We affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Sandy City's action. 
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of 
commercial property located on the north-
west corner of 10^00 South and 1300 East 
in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The 
property abuts Sandy City's boundaries 
and is located within an unincorporated "is-
land" within Sandy City's limits. Since 
1976, the county master plan and Sandy 
City plans have called for rural residential 
uses of the propejrty. 
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In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general 
annexation policy declaration which, among 
other things, delineated twenty-one unin-
corporated islands within the city bound-
aries which Sandy City was willing to an-
nex, including the present parcel. Accord-
ing to Sandy City, thJs policy declaration 
requires property owners to first attempt 
to annex to Sandy City, thereby obviating 
the County's approval for development of 
commercial property when the development 
cost is in excess of $750,000. 
On August 5, 1987, at the property own-
ers' request, the Salt Lake County Commis-
sion, without amending its master plan, 
adopted a zoning ordinance which permit-
ted commercial development on the present 
property. Sandy City objected to the re-
zoning but failed to appeal the decision.1 
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, 
the agent for the property owners and 
Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a 
conditional use permit to build a Chevron 
service station, car wash, and mini-conve-
nience store on .7 acres of the property. 
This application indicated that the estimat-
ed value of the project was $250,000. The 
property owners also intended to build a 
McDonald's restaurant on the property. 
On September 30, 1987, they filed another 
conditional use permit application which 
valued the McDonald's project at approxi-
mately $300,000. The property owners did 
not petition to annex the property to Sandy 
City. 
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City pro-
tested the Chevron application, indicating 
that "Sandy City is currently considering 
annexation of the property and the annexa-
tion will require an independent considera-
tion of proper zoning for this property.'' It 
also unsuccessfully petitioned the Salt 
Lake County Commission to reconsider and 
amend its previously passed zoning ordi-
nance. 
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake Coun-
ty Planning Commission approved the 
Chevron conditional use application. On 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1987), an 
appeal from a zoning decision must be made 
within the time and according to the procedure 
specified by the board of county commissioners. 
October 14, 1987, Sandy City appealed this 
decision. The Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission, following several public hear-
ings, denied Sandy City's appeal and en-
tered findings of fact. 
Sandy City then appealed the conditional 
use decision to the Salt Lake County Com-
mission, which held a hearing on December 
9,1987. The Salt Lake County Commission 
affirmed the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission's grant of the Chevron condi-
tional use permit, finding that the required 
statutory procedure had been followed and 
that the grant of the conditional use permit 
was in the community's interest. Sandy 
City then brought this action in the district 
court. 
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake County 
filed with the district court the affidavit of 
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Planning 
Commission's administrative assistant, and 
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plan-
ning Commission's September 22 and Octo-
ber 13, 1987 meetings, at which Chevron'^ 
conditional use permit application had been 
discussed and interested parties ha<. 
presented evidence. Subsequently, Sand\ 
City submitted an affidavit indicating that 
the projected cost of the Chevron develop-
ment was between $660,000 to $760,00'„ 
and that the cost of the McDonald's devel-
opment would be between $900,000 anc 
$1,100,000. Simultaneously, Salt Lake-
County submitted the minutes of the Apr-
28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake Count;, 
Planning Commission, which involved di. 
cussion of the zoning change, along witii 
Helen Christiansen's authenticating affida-
vit. All parties moved for summary jud;r 
ment. 
Sandy City then moved to strike Sail 
Lake County's affidavits, alleging that they 
failed to conform to the requirements o' 
rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Chevron responded by filing an affi-
davit indicating that the building value of 
the proposed Chevron station was $175,000. 
While these regulations are not a part of this 
record, there is no dispute that Sandy City failed 
to appeal the rezoning pursuant to these regula-
tions. 
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On February 4, 1988, the day before the 
:.^ring on Salt Lake County's motion for 
mammary judgment, Sandy City's attorney 
: oved for additional discovery time pursu-
ant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
^-ocedure. 
Juring the hearing on February 5, 1988, 
alt Lake County requested permission to 
::.t reduce into evidence the certified record 
the administrative hearings. These 
:ords included the previously submitted 
amission minutes, with additional maps 
•j supporting materials. Sandy City's 
iiisel objected, stating that he did not 
_.\v what the administrative record con-
.ned and, thus, the record was prejudicial. 
'. ?. district court overruled Sandy City's 
action and allowed the record to be en-
ed into evidence. On February 19, 1988, 
;t Lake County submitted the minutes of 
December 9, 1987 meeting of the Salt 
:e County Commission, containing the 
- ^eal of the conditional use permit grant, 
•ng with the administrative assistant's 
cporting affidavit. 
Salt Lake County filed the complete cer-
'.ied administrative record with the dis-
. .1 court on March 3, 1988. On March 15, 
>8. the district court entered its decision, 
ending that the Salt Lake County Planning 
( ommission had properly issued the condi-
tional use permit, and that defendants' ac-
tions did not violate the annexation statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986). It 
rented summary judgment in favor of de-
fendants and dismissed Sandy City's action. 
Subsequently, Sandy City unsuccessfully 
moved for an injunction on the develop-
ment of the property during the pendency 
of the appeal. It then brought this appeal. 
On appeal, Sandy City challenges the 
:ummary judgment, first arguing that 
rhere were substantial issues of material 
i'act making summary judgment improper 
because: (1) Salt Lake County untimely 
submitted the administrative record in vio-
lation of rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; (2) Salt Lake County's adminis-
trative record and affidavits were untimely 
-. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes 
and characterizes some of the issues as annexa-
tion-related, however this appeal is from the 
filed in violation of rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) the affidavits 
and other evidence J presented by Chevron 
violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate evi-
dentiary foundation ,^ (4) the trial court 
erred in refusing to trant Sandy City's rule 
56(f) motion for further discovery; and (5) 
there were substantial issuer of material 
fact in the record. Sandy City's second 
major assignment of error is tfyat the trial 
court erroneously interpreted Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 10-2-418 akd 10-1-104^11) (1986) 
by ruling that (1) to preclude urban devel-
opment of the property at issue, Sandy City 
had to formally declare its intention to an-
nex it prior to the occurrence of the events 
leading to this lawsujit, and (2) the Chevron 
development, and pdssibly the McDonald's 
development, did not constitute "urban de-
velopment" under section 10-1-104(11). 
I. FACTUAL AND 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Before we addres^ Sandy City's conten-
tions, however, it is necessary to examine 
the scope of our review in cases dealing 
with summary judgment and municipal 
zoning issues.2 
[1] In reviewing £ summary judgment, 
an appellate court "ccjnsiderfs] the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, and affirm[s] inly where it appears 
there is no genuine dispute as to any mate-
rial issues of fact, or Where, even according 
to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving parky is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law." Briggs v. Hoi-
comb, 740 P.2d 281 283 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987). 
[2,3] It is well established in Utah that 
"courts of law cannot (substitute their judg-
ment in the area of zoning regulations for 
that of the [municipality's] governing 
body." Naylor v. Sc^lt Lake City Corp., 
16 Utah 2d 192, 39^ P.2d 27, 29 (1965) 
(footnote omitted). Instead, the courts af-
ford a comparatively Iwide latitude of dis-
grant of a conditional use permit, a zoning 
function. 
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cretion to administrative bodies charged 
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as 
endowing their actions with a presumption 
of correctness and validity, because of the 
complexity of factors involved in the mat-
ter of zoning and the specialized knowledge 
of the administrative body. Cottonwood 
Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of 
Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, the courts will not consider the 
wisdom, necessity, or advisability or other-
wise interfere with a zoning determination 
unless "it is shown that there is no reason-
able basis to justify the action taken." Id. 
[4] In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-15 (1986) indicates that an aggriev-
ed party may "maintain a plenary action 
for relief from any decision of the munici-
pal body within thirty days of the filing of 
the decision. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[t]he statutory language 'ple-
nary action for relief therefrom ' presup-
poses the continued existence of the admin-
istrative action, thus suggesting an appeal 
rather than a trial de novo." Xanthos v. 
Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 
(Utah 1984). However, "[t]he nature and 
extent of the review depends on what hap-
pened below as reflected by a true record 
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of 
accepted due process requirements." Den-
ver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Central 
Weber Sewer Improvement Dist, 4 Utah 
2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). The su-
preme court also found, in Xanthos, that 
where a hearing has proceeded in accord-
ance with due process requirements, the 
reviewing court can look only to the record, 
which consists of the hearing minutes 
along with the formal findings and order. 
Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. However, 
where no record is preserved, and there is, 
consequently, nothing to review, the re-
viewing court may take evidence. Id. 
While this evidence is not necessarily limit-
ed to the evidence presented below, the 
reviewing court may not retry the case on 
the merits or substitute its judgment for 
that of the municipal body. Id. 
Because an administrative record has 
been preserved in the present circum-
stance, we find that this matter should be 
reviewed on the record, and that a de novo 
trial is inappropriate. 
Under these standards of review, we now 
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial 
court improperly granted summary judg-
ment on evidentiary issues. 
A. Admission of Administrative 
Record 
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake 
County untimely submitted the administra-
tive record in violation of rule 6(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues 
that rule 6(d) requires supporting affidavits 
to be submitted at the time a party files a 
motion for summary judgment, and that 
the administrative record is analogous to a 
supporting affidavit. Because the County 
submitted the administrative record during 
the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, rather than beforehand, and, 
consequently, failed to give Sandy City no-
tice of the contents of the record, Sandy 
City concludes that the trial court should 
not have considered the evidence container 
in this record in arriving at its summan 
judgment. On the other hand, the County 
argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure do 
not set forth any specific procedure for 
certifying an administrative record from i 
county commission to the district court, so 
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because r 
deals only with the filing of affidavits. 
In relevant part, rule 6(d) states: 
When a motion is supported by an affida-
vit, the affidavit shall be served with the 
motion; and, except as otherwise provid 
ed in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits ma\ 
be served not later than 1 day before thr 
hearing, unless the court permits them u 
be served at some other time. 
[5] Prior to the hearing before the dis-
trict court on February 5, 1988, the County 
submitted the minutes of the Salt Lak<-
County Planning Commission hearings held 
on April 28, May 12, September 22, October 
13, and October 27, 1987, along with au-
thenticating affidavits. These minutes con-
tained testimony on all of the disputed is-
sues. The record which the County moved 
to be placed into evidence during the dis-
trict court hearing contained these minutes, 
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accompanied by some documentation and a 
large quantity of plat maps, but did not add 
materially to the relevant information al-
ready before the court. The court admit-
ted this record into evidence over the stren-
uous objections of Sandy City, stating that 
"everything down there is not essential to 
a determination of these motions. And I 
think that quite apart from this, [even] if 
the court disregarded this, it will have be-
fore it sufficient undisputed facts of law to 
make decisions in the matter." Subse-
quently, the court admitted into evidence, 
as part of the record, the minutes of the 
.-'alt Lake County Commission hearing held 
<;n December 9, 1987, which had not previ-
ously been available, and various doc-
uments that were specifically requested by 
Jundy City's attorney. 
Our review of the record, including the 
administrative record submitted to the 
oourt, indicates that if there was any error 
in admitting the administrative record, it 
was harmless because it was essentially 
emulative with respect to the evidence 
already before the court. Further, some of 
"he subsequently admitted evidence was 
admitted at Sandy City's request. 
[6] However, we find that the trial 
court did not err in admitting the adminis-
trative record at the time of trial. If we 
follow rule 6(d) literally, styling the admin-
istrative record as the equivalent of an 
affidavit in support of a motion for summa-
ry judgment, the documents must be 
served not later than one day before the 
hearing unless the court permits them to 
be served at some other time. The court, 
therefore, has discretion to admit such doc-
uments at other times, including during the 
hearing. In this case, the court admitted 
documents during and after the hearing, in 
response to requests made by both parties. 
However, there are limitations to this 
discretion. Although the Utah Supreme 
Court has found that the notice provisions 
of rule 6(d) are not hard and fast, it has 
stated that a trial court may dispense with 
technical compliance to them only if there 
is satisfactory proof that a party had "actu-
al notice and time to prepare to meet the 
questions raised by the motion of an adver-
sary." Jensen i). Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 
519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnote omitted); 
see also Western States Thrift & Loan Co. 
v. Blomquist, 29J Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019, 
1021 (1972); BaiVas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 
269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962). 
Although Sandy City objected to the ad-
mission of the administrative record on the 
ground that it aid not know what it con-
tained and, therefore, was unprepared to 
argue against it, the trial court properly 
denied this objection because the entire 
record was a matter of public record, had 
been on file for a substantial period of time 
prior to the hearing, and both parties had 
access to it. Further, significant portions 
of the record, in the form of the commis-
sion minutes, were already before the court 
and Sandy City 
become familiar 
pad ample opportunity to 
with them. We find no 
abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. 
B. Adequate \Evidentiary Foundation 
Sandy City's nbxt claim of error is that 
the affidavits and other evidence presented 
by Chevron and the other defendants vio-
late rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure because they lacked an adequate 
evidentiary foundation. 
[7] The relevant portion of rule 56(e) 
states that "[supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal knowl-
edge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show af-
firmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein." In-
admissible evidence cannot be considered in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
D & L Supply v\ Saurini, lib P.2d 420, 
421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments v. 
State Farm Ins\ Co., Ill P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah Ct.App.198W; so an affidavit which 
does not meet the requirements of rule 
56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. How-
ick v. Bank of Skit Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 
498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blom-
quisU 504 P.2d i t 1020-21 (an affidavit 
containing statements made only "on infor-
mation and belief]' is insufficient and will 
be disregarded). 
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Sandy City moved to strike defendants' 
affidavits for their failure to conform to 
these requirements. In its motion to 
strike, Sandy City attacked defendant 
Chevron's memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment and the affi-
davit of Helen J. Christiansen, along with 
its attached exhibits, to the extent that 
they were used to establish the allegations 
set forth in Chevron's memorandum. 
[8] Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits 
served to establish that she was the custo-
dian of the record before the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission and that, on 
the basis of her personal knowledge, the 
hearing minutes and a copy of McDonald's 
Corporation's application for a conditional 
use permit were the correct records of the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission. 
Under rules 902(4) and 1005 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, public records are ad-
missible as an exception to the general rule 
excluding hearsay evidence if they are 
"certified as correct by the custodian." 
Utah R.Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Chris-
tiansen's affidavit conformed to rule 56(e) 
with regard to the admission of the exhibits 
as portions of the administrative record 
before the Salt Lake County Planning Com-
mission. As such, they are admissible evi-
dence and are not subject to a motion to 
strike. 
Sandy City challenges various state-
ments made in these minutes as being with-
out evidentiary foundation. These allega-
tions, however, go to the merits of grant-
ing the conditional use permit and not to 
any procedural defects. Therefore, we are 
not concerned with them under our stan-
dard of review. Consequently, we find 
Sandy City's objections to the foundation of 
statements made in the record to be with-
out merit. 
C. Further Discovery 
[9] Sandy City argues that the district 
court erred in refusing to permit it to con-
duct further discovery pursuant to rule 
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 56(f) provides that a court may contin-
ue a motion for summary judgment to per-
mit the moving party to obtain affidavits or 
take depositions. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 
414, 416 (Utah 1990). Rule 56(f) reads as 
follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to 
permit affidavits to be obtained or depo-
sitions to be taken or discovery to be had 
or may make such other order as is just. 
It is generally held that rule 56(f) mo-
tions should be granted liberally to provide 
adequate opportunity for discovery, Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 
838, 841 (Utah Ct.App.1987) because infor- ' 
mation gained during discovery may create 
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. Down-
town Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275, 278 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However, 
courts are unwilling to "spare the litigant'-
from their own lack of diligence,'' Cal-
lioux, 745 P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v. 
Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1984)), 
so do not grant rule 56(f) motions when 
dilatory or lacking in merit. Reeves v. Gei-
gy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 63^ 
(Utah Ct.App.1988); Downtown Athletic 
Club, 740 P.2d at 278-79. 
[10] A rule 56(f) movant must file a:, 
affidavit to preserve his or her contention 
that summary judgment should be delayer 
pending further discovery. Callioux, 74--
P.2d at 841. In this affidavit, the movant 
must explain how the requested continu 
ance will aid his or her opposition to sum-
mary judgment. Id. The trial court In-
discretion to determine whether the rea 
sons stated in a rule 56(f) affidavit arc-
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639. 
[11] Sandy City filed an affidavit with 
the court along with its rule 56(f) motion, 
stating that it had been unable to take 
defendants' depositions or to obtain a certi-
fied copy of certain county commission 
minutes. It indicated that it wanted to 
pursue additional discovery which would 
show that: (1) the proposed use of the 
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property contradicted the county master 
plan and that insufficient evidence had 
been presented to the County Planning 
Commission to demonstrate conformity 
with the plan; (2) the proposed zoning 
would not contribute to the general well-be-
ing of the neighborhood; (3) the proposed 
use would be detrimental to the health, 
safety, and general welfare of persons re-
siding in the vicinity; (4) the true scope, 
costs, and impact of the development was 
not accurately and fully communicated to 
the county officials during the decision-
making process; and (5) the costs of the 
development would substantially exceed 
$750,000. 
To determine whether this affidavit was 
sufficient to merit a rule 56(f) continuance, 
several factors must have been considered: 
(1) Were the reasons articulated in the 
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the 
parly aga'mst whom summary judgment 
is sought merely on a "fishing expedi-
tion" for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant evi-
dence? (2) Was there sufficient time 
since the inception of the lawsuit for the 
party against whom the summary judg-
ment is sought to use discovery proce-
dures, and thereby cross-examine the 
moving party? (3) If discovery proce-
dures were timely initiated, was the non-
moving party afforded an appropriate re-
sponse? 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 
764 P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club, 
740 P.2d at 278. 
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings 
state, in part: 
1. The estimated cost of the development is 
approximately $175,000 
2. Thjs development is consistent with the 
intent ot the Salt Lake County Master Plan by 
placing commercial development at major in-
tersections within the county. The Little Cot-
tonwood District Plan was generally intended 
to be applicable through 1985 and the map is 
now outdated in this immediate area. Since 
the adoption of the plan in 1976, Sandy City 
rezoned the northeast corner of 10600 South 
1300 East to commercial, which changed the 
character of the intersection. Additional 
commercial development is now appropriate 
at this intersection and is consistent with the 
existing development approved by Sandy City. 
Utah Rep 791-796 P 2d—12 
In determining if Sandy City's request 
for further discovery was meritorious, we 
first consider the relevant standard of re-
view. As w£ noted above, in municipal 
zoning decisions, the courts do not consider 
the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of 
particular actfons. See Sandy City v. City 
of South Jordan, 652 P.2d 1316, 1318-19 
(Utah 1982). Instead, the reviewing court 
may consider) whether the municipality act-
ed in conformance with its enabling stat-
utes and ordinances pursuant to its compre-
hensive plan 
Corp., 16 Utkh 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 
(1965). The 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City 
court may not substitute its 
judgment foif that of the municipality on 
the merits of (these issues, however. Id. at 
129. 
The trial record contained evidence as to 
Salt Lake County's enabling statutes, ordi-
nances, and plans. It also indicated that 
the Salt Lafce County Commission con-
sidered evidence with respect to all the 
issues on which Sandy City wished to per-
form additional discovery. The Salt Lake 
County Commission made findings of fact 
going to the merits of these issues.3 Dis-
covery relating to the merits of the issues 
was improper under the standard of re-
view, but could properly be held with re-
spect to enabling statutes and procedural 
issues. However, there was already sub-
stantial evidence on the record regarding 
the relevant enabling statutes and plans. 
Further, Saifdy City did not allege in its 
affidavit that it needed additional time to 
discover procedural errors committed by 
3. The development will provide additional 
gasoline services which are needed and desir-
able in the neighborhood and community 
4. The development is buffered from adja-
ctnt residential uses by property zoned R-M 
and will not be detrimental to the health, 
safety or ieneral welfare of persons residing 
or working in the vicinity or injurious to 
property pr improvements in the vicinity. 
The traffib engineer has reviewed and ap-
proved the application. Upon compliance 
with the conditions reqjired by the Planning 
Commission, the development will be an at-
tractive addition to the community. 
5. The proposed use will comply with the 
regulation and conditions of the Zoning Ordi-
nance. 
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Salt Lake County in granting the condition-
al building permit. Therefore, we find that 
the trial court could reasonably conclude 
that the reasons Sandy City articulated in 
its affidavit would produce only cumulative 
evidence and, so, were inadequate to merit 
a continuance under rule 56(f). 
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time 
and opportunity during the pendency of the 
action before the county commissions to 
develop and present evidence in its favor 
and to determine and refute the defen-
dants' evidence. The record indicates that 
on August 5, 1987, the Salt Lake County 
Commission adopted the zoning ordinance 
allowing commercial development on the 
property at issue, following hearings on the 
issue held in April and May of 1987. Sandy 
City objected to the rezoning at this time 
but failed to appeal. On August 26, 1987, 
Postero-Blecker applied for the Chevron 
conditional use permit. Sandy City protest-
ed the application on September 18, 1987, 
and subsequently was involved in several 
public hearings on the issue before both 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
and the Salt Lake County Commission, at 
which it had ample opportunity to present 
evidence. Sandy City appealed to the dis-
trict court in December 1987. The hearing 
on the summary judgment motion was fi-
nally held on February 5, 1988, nearly a 
year after the initial zoning hearings had 
taken place. As stated previously, the 
court will not use a rule 56(f) motion to 
shield the movant from his or her lack of 
diligence. 
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion, 
[t]he mere averment of exclusive knowl-
edge or control of the facts by the mov-
ing party is not adequate: the opposing 
party must show to the best of his ability 
what facts are within the movant's exclu-
sive knowledge or control; what steps 
have been taken to obtain the desired 
information pursuant to discovery proce-
dures under the Rules; and that he is 
desirous of taking advantage of these 
discovery procedures. 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J. 
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's 
Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)). 
Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with 
these requirements. Therefore, we con-
clude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Sandy City's rule 
56(f) motion. 
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Sandy City argues that the court failed 
to consider evidence which created the fol-
lowing genuine issues of material fact: (1) 
Sandy City's willingness to annex, as 
shown by its express declaration in its an-
nexation policy declaration and its attor-
ney's statements before the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission; (2) that the 
projected cost of the Chevron project ex-
ceeded $750,000, as shown by a certified 
appraisal setting the cost as between $660,-
000 and $760,000; (3) that the Chevron 
station was only part of a larger scheme to 
develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in that the 
Chevron station would take only V<> of the 
parcel, the property owners' represented 
that the property would be a "commercial 
subdivision," and that they would be the 
sole developers of the entire tract; (4) that 
the cost for the entire development, exclud-
ing the cost of the land, would exceed 
$750,000; and (5) the development was not 
in compliance with the county master plan 
and county ordinances which called for ru-
ral use of the subject property, and would 
create traffic hazards and planning prob-
lems. 
[12] Many of these issues are actually 
issues of law. The only issues of fact are 
the projected cost of the project and wheth-
er the proposed development was in compli-
ance with the county master plan and coun-
ty ordinances. As we have noted above, 
these issues were discussed and evidence 
was presented before the county commis-
sions, which entered written findings and 
decided them on their merits. Because 
their findings were supported by evidence, 
we do not disturb them on review. See 
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 
P.2d 883, 885-86 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (ad-
ministrative agency's factual findings will 
not be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary 
and capricious"). 
SANDY CITY v. SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Cite as 794 ?2d 482 (UtahApp. 1990) 
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II. LEGAL ISSUES 
We next address Sandy City's contention 
that the trial court erred in its interpreta-
tion and application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-418 (1986) and § 10-1-104(11) 
(1986). Because summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law rather than 
fact, the appellate court is free to reap-
praise the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 498 
(Utah 1989) (per curiam); Parents Against 
Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Home-
owner's Ass% 789 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah Ct. 
App.1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 
34, 35 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
A. Annexation Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 prohibits ur-
ban development "within one-half mile of a 
municipality in the unincorporated territory 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy declara-
tion, if a municipality is willing to annex 
the territory proposed for such develop-
ment under the standards and require-
ments set forth in this chapter." (Empha-
sis added.) The parties disagree as to 
whether Sandy City, to prevent urban de-
velopment in the disputed territory, was 
required under this statute to formally de-
clare its intention to annex the territory 
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-414 (1986) re-
quires a municipality, prior to annexing 
unincorporated territory of more than five 
acres, to adopt a policy declaration indicat-
ing the standard under which it is willing 
to annex the territory. Sandy City argues 
that it expressly declared its willingness to 
annex the property before initiation of the 
present lawsuit by (1) promulgating a gen-
eral policy declaration indicating its willing-
ness to annex the property, if petitioned, 
along with twenty other parcels; and (2) its 
counsel's direct statement to the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission that it was 
willing to annex the property. The trial 
court found that Sandy City was obliged to 
4. We note tharrhe property at issue consists of 
4.18 acres while section 10-2-418 applies to 
parcels consisting of at least five acres. There-
make a formal declaration of intent to an-
nex, in addition to its general policy decla-
ration, to invoke the protection of section 
10-2-414. 
[13] Ev^n though Sandy City, in its 
master policy declaration, had indicated its 
interest in annexing the property should 
the property owners so petition, the proper-
ty owners rjever petitioned, nor did Sandy 
City attempt to annex the property on its 
own. Further, it did not appeal the coun-
ty's initial ztining decision pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. k 10-9-9 (1986), and raise this 
issue at that time. Instead, it waited to 
raise the issue on the subsequent grant of 
the conditional use permit, where the rele-
vant issues qo not include the proposed use 
of the land lor any annexation issue, but 
only whether the proposed use comports 
with the previously enacted zoning regula-
tions and county master plan. Because 
Sandy City could and should have raised 
this issue earlier, we find that it is preclud-
ed from raising it now. See Ringwood v. 
Foreign Autb Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah Ct.Apb.1990). As such, we do not 
address the ssue of whether Sandy City 
was required under section 10-2-418, in 
addition to its master policy declaration, to 
officially declare its willingness to annex a 
territory of less than five acres.4 Conse-
quently, we fjnd Sandy City's objection to 
be without m^rit. 
We affirm j the trial court's finding 
against Sandy City on this issue, even 
though we assign a totally different ratio-
nale than that used by the trial court. See, 
e.g., Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 716 
(Utah Ct.App.i990). 
B. Urban pevelopment 
Utah Code Alnn. § 10-2-418 (1986) states 
that "[u]rban development shall not be ap-
proved or permitted within one-half mile of 
a municipality lin the unincorporated area 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy declara-
tion." "Urban development" is defined in 
Utah Code Anji. § 10-1-104(11) (1986) as 
fore, section 1042-418 would be inapplicable in 
the present casq. 
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"a housing subdivision involving more than 
15 residential units with an average of less 
than one acre per residential unit or a 
commercial or industrial development for 
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for 
any or all phases." 
Pursuant to its objective of preventing 
the proposed development of the disputed 
territory, Sandy City argues that the trial 
court erred in finding the value of the 
proposed development did not exceed $750,-
000 because (1) the definition of "urban 
development" under section 10-1-104 in-
cludes not only the value of the building 
itself, but also the cost of the land and the 
value of the building fixtures; and (2) the 
$750,000 figure encompasses all commer-
cial ventures to be built on the disputed 
territory. Salt Lake County, on the other 
hand, alleges that the only relevant cost 
under the definition is that of the building 
alone and does not include the land and 
building fixtures, and that the $750,000 fig-
ure applies to each individual development 
venture separately initiated on the proper-
ty. 
[14] Again, because Sandy City has not 
made any attempt to annex the territory 
and should have raised its objections to 
urban development at the time of the zon-
ing determination rather than at the subse-
quent granting of a conditional use permit, 
we decline to interpret this statute. Be-
cause the interpretation of section 10-2-
414 would have no relevance to the proprie-
ty of the county's grant of a conditional 
use permit under our standard of review, 
any interpretation we would make would 
be an advisory opinion, which we decline to 
issue under well established standards of 
judicial review. See Ringwood v. Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (where the result in the 
prior action constitutes the full relief avail-
able to the parties on the same claim, or 
where the issue could and should have been 
litigated in the prior action, the claim is 
precluded under the doctrine of res judica-
ta); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 
1045 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (there is a long-
standing judicial policy in Utah to avoid 
advisory opinions). Therefore, we find this 
issue to be without merit. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
BENCH, J., concurs in the result. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRDl JUDICIAL DI^&HPGf,erk 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
C^IVIL NO. C-87-7304 
Plaintiff's and defendants1 Motion^ for Summary Judgment 
came before this Court on the 5th day df February, 1988. All 
parties were represented by respective counsel. After argument, 
the Court took the matter under advisemerit. On the 25th day of 
February, 1988, Salt Lake County's Motidn for Certification of 
Record came before this Court. The natter was taken under 
advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record. After 
reviewing the file, Memoranda, record arid arguments, the Court 
finds as follows. 
1. Salt Lake County Commission act^d properly in rezoning 
the property in question, and was not in Violation of any county 
ordinance or county master plan, and did ifiot act arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived its 
right to object to rezoning. 
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2. Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake 
County Commission properly issued a conditional use permit for 
development of the subject property. The project, based on the 
facts, is necessary and desirable, and not detrimental to the 
general welfare. Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated 
acted properly in processing its application through the only 
body with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County. Sandy City 
did not have jurisdiction to accept the application. 
3. Defendants1 actions do not violate Utah Code Ann., 
Section 10-2-418. 
(a) Defendants1 development does not constitute "urban 
development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area. 
(b) Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex 
the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation. 
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated 
that it would annex the subject property. Even if Chevron 
petitioned for annexation and Sandy City annexed, there is no 
assurance Sandy City would approve Chevron's application. 
Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for 
annexation. 
(c) The value of the fixtures and personal property 
should not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000.00. Furthermore, the 
application of Chevron should be considered a single development. 
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(d) Even if Chevronfs application were not considered 
a single development, and were combined with McDonald's project, 
the project will still not exceed $750,000.00. 
(e) At this time Chevron has jtaken all the necessary 
procedures for approval of their application, and is ready to 
proceed with their project. 
4. Based on the facts before the Court, it appears that 
Salt Lake County Commission has conducted a hearing that 
comported with all due process requiremenis. It appears to have 
acted within the scope of its authority, fias conducted hearings, 
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted in 
excess of its authority, or in a manner sol clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City. 555 P.2d 
281 (1976). 
5. Accordingly, it is the opinion ot this Court that Sandy 
City's Motion to Strike should be denied, £md Sandy City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be denied. Ifurthermore, all of the 
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Certification should be granted. Counsel for 
defendant Chevron is to prepare an Order f<^ r the Court's 
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signature. Said Order should be approved as to form by all 
parties. 
Dated this / j ~ day of March, 1988. 
RAYMOND S. UNO " 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
^ H.iDiXCrJH)?-DLEY 
S^\A \ O A Clb«.( 
By ^ ^ M ^ . G ; - ' 'I 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this_ _day of March, 198|8: 
Walter R. Miller 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent S. Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County Defendants 
2001 S. State, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Leonard J. Lewis 
John W. Andrews 
Attorneys for Defendant Chevron 
50 S. Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Attorney for Defendants Yeates, Priest, 
Kjar and Smoot 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947 
John W. Andrews, #4724 
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SM00T4 POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A., INC., 
Defendants. 
The following matters came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th 
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt 
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and 
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Lhah 
APR? W* 
tuty Clerk 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-7304 
Honorable Raymond Uno 
Motion For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
Motion To Strike. Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews 
appeared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; Kent S. 
Lewis appeared on behalf of defendants Salt I^ ake County and 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission; Brintop. R. Burbidge 
appeared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjar,| Priest and 
Yeates; and Walter R. Miller appeared on beha|lf of plaintiff 
Sandy City. 
The Court having reviewed the recordl and the memoranda 
and arguments of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff Sandy City's Motion Fbr Summary 
Judgment and Motion To Strike are denied; 
(2) It appearing that no material issues of fact 
exist, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, defendants1 Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby 
granted. It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of 
Sandy City in this action and all causes of action contained 
therein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed 
with prejudice. / 
DATED this {> day of April, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST
 0 n \f 
H DIXON HiNDLEY ^^j^^y^^^^^^^^ '--v 
••• ' p.4,,, y.H/i/X'J^^ Raymond S. Uno 
*&*&&-*%*C p e ^ ^ T District Judge 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAN GOTT, BAGLE1, 
& MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq. 
John W. Andrews, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Walter R. Miller, Esq. 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent S. Lewis, Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Defendants 
2001 South State Street 
#53600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeates 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
5747A 
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Walter R. Miller, #2268 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 566-1561 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Ot UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A. INC., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WALTER R. MILLER 
Civil No. C87-07304 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
WALTER R. MILLER, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. He is the duly appointed City Attorney for Sandy 
City (hereinafter "City") and has held thijs position since May 
1, 1986. Affiant has practiced as an attorney and a member of 
the Utah State Bar since 1972. Previous tjo his appointment as 
City Attorney, affiant has served in severtal public positions 
Q0U Q138 
including staff attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C. and Deputy City Attorney (Chief of the Civil 
Division) for Salt Lake City Corporation. 
2. Affiant's duties as City Attorney include 
representation of the City in legal actions against it. In 
this capacity, affiant serves as counsel of record for the City 
in the above-entitled action. 
3. By letter dated November 19, 1987, affiant 
inquired of Defendant's counsel, as to a convenient date for 
Defendant K. Delyn Yeates' deposition. Defendant's counsel did 
not respond to that inquiry. A copy of affiant's letter of 
inquiry is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. Affiant has been informed that some information 
sought by the City in this action will eventually be made a 
public record, which will be available for the City informally 
and outside of regular discovery process. One such document, 
minutes of the County Commission meeting of December 9, 1987, 
contains information as to the scope, costs and impact of 
development of the property, which is critical to the City's 
case. Affiant has twice sought a certified copy of such 
minutes for court purposes but has been informed by the County 
Commission Clerk that the minutes have not yet been approved by 
the County Commission. The clerk informed affiant that the 
minutes are not scheduled for approval until February 8, 1988. 
5. Aside from discovery from other parties, the City 
has initiated study and public review of appropriate 
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development which relate to this action atid have invited 
Defendants to participate in this review. Such study and 
review is currently underway but has not yet been completed. 
Affiant believes such study and review will produce 
information vital to prosecution of this action. 
6. Discovery by the City is incomplete in this action 
and affiant is of the opinion, based on information and belief, 
that information sought in discovery will create genuine issues 
of material fact sufficient to defeat Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment, including but not limited to the following: 
a. That zoning and proposed uses for the 
property contradict the County master plan and that 
insufficient evidence was presented to th^ County Planning 
Commission to demonstrate conformity with that plan, as 
required by County ordinance. 
b. That the proposed zoning and use is 
unnecessary or undesirable or will not contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood anc} community and that 
evidence concerning such subjects was not appropriately 
presented by Defendants to County officials, as required by 
County ordinance. 
c. That the zoning and proposed uses will be 
detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property 
or improvements in the vicinity, and that (evidence of such 
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matters was not appropriately presented to County officials as 
required by ordinance. 
d. That the true scope, costs and impact of 
development, in all phases, for the property, including but not 
limited to land acquisition and improvement, financing, general 
construction, fixturing, development fees and service 
connections, as known to Defendant developers, were not fully 
and accurately communicated to County officials during the 
decision-making process. 
e. That Defendants' "commercial subdivision" was 
not platted and approved as required by state statute and that 
all evidence will be consistent in demonstrating that the costs 
of development of that subdivision substantially exceed 
$750,000. 
7. The document attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a 
true and correct copy of objections filed with Salt Lake 
County, by affiant on behalf of the City. 
DATED this y day of February, 1988. 
/Slter R. Miller 
City Attorney 
t^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this jf^ day of 
February, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: commission 
~zz Notary Public, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
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EXHIBIT A 
November 19, 1987 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Sandy City v. Salt Lake County 
Civil No. C 87-07304 
Dear Mr. Burbidge: 
Thank you for your telephone call last Tuesday, informing me 
of your representation of the property owners in the above action 
and inquiring as to whether a meeting of our clients would be 
helpful in resolving "this dispute. I"regret that we -have been 
unable to catch each other by telephone since that time. 
I wish to confirm my statement to you during our earlier 
conversation that I do think that a meetijng would be useful as a 
step in resolving some of the complaints we discussed frankly by 
phone. I have proposed such a meeting td several Sandy City 
officials and they agree that discussion could be productive. 
Of course, I do not mean to imply by this letter that a 
decision on annexation or zoning will be made in an informal 
meeting with your clients. As you are avjare from your 
representation of public entities, statuses govern the means by 
which such issues are determined, which nieans generally involve 
notice and public hearing. Nevertheless, recommendations can be 
formulated through informal discussions yhich can be of 
significant influence on the decision-making process. 
We sincerely solicit your contribution to these processes. 
Please let us know of any interest your cjlients may have in 
further discussion. 
With regard to the legal action, the City is interested in 
taking the deposition of Mr. K. Delyn Yeates, preferably within 
the next two weeks. Please let me know if there is a convenient 
time Mr. Yeates could be made available for this purpose. 
eon/*, "bhP407n |(arvncep.«ce5i t\i*KJ<* QQO -Z02 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
November 19, 1987 
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Very truly yours, 
Walter R. Miller 
City Attorney 
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EXHIBIT B 
In the Matter of a Conditional : OBJECTION TO 
Use Applications for a 
Chevron Service Station and : PROPOSED FINDINGS 
McDonald's Outlet located at 
10600 South 1300 East : PH87-2177/87-2214 
Sandy City ("City") hereby objects to the proposed findings 
of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission ("Commission") in the 
captioned conditional use applications. |Such objection is based 
upon the following: 
1. Proposed Finding No. 1 is erroneous in that estimates 
the cost of development without considering land costs or all 
phases of development and without basing Isuch estimate on 
competent evidence. Such finding is also faulty in that it 
narrowly and erroneously construes the requirements of 10-2-418 
Utah Code Anno. 1953, which requires the applicant to apply for 
annexation as a condition of development ^nd which prohibits the 
Commission from approving or permitting applicant's development 
request when the City is willing to annex|. Such construction is 
directly contrary to 10-1-102, Utah Code Anno. 1953, which 
provides that powers of Cities are to be liberally construed to 
permit municipalities to exercise their annexation powers. 
2. Subsection D of County Ordinance JL9.84.090 provides 
that the applicant's conditional use must be denied unless 
evidence is presented to the Commission which establishes that 
the proposed use conforms to the intent of the county master 
plan. Proposed Finding No. 2 is erroneous in that it (a) implies 
that the proposed use is in conformity wiih the master plan, 
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whereas the use expressly contradicts such plan; (b) implies that 
the Commission has authority to ignore such plan and County 
Ordinance 19,84.090 because the Commission considers the master 
plan to be "outdated;" and (c) makes conclusions of a factual 
nature which were not presented as evidence to the Commission, 
which are contrary to testimony before the Commission, and which 
are inconsistent with determinations made by the Commission prior 
to and subsequent to its approval of the applicant's use. 
3. Subsection A of County Ordinance 19-84-090 requires 
that applicant's use must be denied unless evidence is presented 
which establishes that the proposed use is necessary or desirable 
to provide a service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the community. 
Proposed Finding No. 3 erroneously suggests that the Commission 
considered such issue, took evidence thereon, and thereafter 
concluded that additional gasoline services were necessary; 
whereas, no such evidence was presented to the Commission and had 
the Commission considered this issue, a general community benefit 
not have been shown for reasons more fully set forth in the 
City's appeal from the Commission's decision in this matter 
("City's Appeal"). 
4. Subsection B of County Ordinance 19-84-090 requires 
that the use cannot be authorized unless evidence is presented 
which establishes that the use will not be detrimental to the 
health, safety or general welfare of persons residing or working 
in the vicinity, or injurious to property or improvements in the 
vicinity. Proposed Finding No. 4 erroneously concludes that no 
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detriment will inure to the community from the development, which 
conclusion incorrectly implies that such issue was considered and 
evidence was taken by the Commission on this matter and ignores 
the protests and concerns of both the City and many area 
residents. Many of such concerns are more fully set forth in the 
City's Appeal. 
5. Proposed Finding No. 5 concludes jthat the proposed use 
will comply with the regulation and conditions of the Zoning 
Ordinance. Such finding is erroneous in that the Commission's 
approval directly violates County Ordinance 19.84.090, as more 
fully set forth above. 
DATED this^Z_ day of November, 1987. 
WALTER R. MILDER 
SANDY CITY ATTORNEY 
\C4 
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